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I I I . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended) and Rules 3(a) and 4 of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
I \i 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court's failure to grant 
appellant/defendant's Motion for Continuance was inappropriate? 
The standard of review for determining whether to grant a 
continuance is the "abuse of discretion" standard by acting 
unreasonable. Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 
1978). 
II. Whether trial courtfs statements concerning possible 
repercussions resulting from appellant/defendant's decision to 
depose witnesses was improper and precluded appellant/defendant 
from deposing witnesses? Rulings of questions of law by the 
trial court will be reviewed by I*1IP appellate court for 
correctness and accord them no particular deference. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1988). 
III. Whether the trial court's decision not to admit 
appellant!s documentary evidence of work performed by both 
parties to the contract was improper? The trial court's 
determination as to admissibility will not be upset absent an 
1 
abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Van Geruen, 790 P.2d 62 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990) . 
IV. Whether the trial court's theory and grounds for 
determining whether appellant terminated the contract between the 
parties was proper? The trial court's interpretation of a 
contract is not entitled to any particular weight on appeal, 
where the court interprets contract as matter of law without 
regard for extrinsic evidence* Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 
P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
V. Whether the findings of fact drafted by appellee 
accurately reflected the trial court's findings? The trial 
court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
they "are against the clear weight of the evidence", or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite or firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). 
V. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following rules are applicable to the issues on appeal. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
that it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
2 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
A statement not specifically covered by any 
of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness [will not be excluded] if the 
court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) 
the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. 
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its 
discretion , and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a 
trial or proceeding upon good cause shown. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially (sic) and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon ... 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous ... 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the judgment granted by the Third 
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Circuit Court, Summit County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston 
presiding. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of service 
contract. Parties entered into an agreement, partly written and 
partly oral, for plaintiff to perform interior design work on 
defendant's home. Plaintiff's work was unsatisfactory and 
defendant terminated the contract before the work had been 
substantially completed. Appellant contends that he was not 
given sufficient time to prepare his defense and was not given a 
fair trial. Appellant maintains that the following acts by the 
trial court prevented a fair trial: 
a. Defendant's Motion for Continuance was granted for 
either one week after the trial date (when defendant was to be 
out of town), or granted for the same day the trial date was 
previously set. The trial was held on the date of the original 
trial date set. 
b. Defendant was told by the trial judge that 
depositions might result in an attorneys' fees judgment against 
the defendant regardless of whether there was in fact an 
attorneys' fee provision. 
c. The trial court did not allow admission of 
relevant evidence relating to the amount of work addressed in the 
contract by either party. 
<3L. The trial court found that plaintiff substantially 
completed the interior design work and therefore the total design 
fee of $8,000 was due to plaintiff, minus the amount that 
defendant had already paid towards satisfaction of this amount. 
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e. The trial court found that the type of contract 
entered into by the parties was not terminated by defendant; 
defendants1 attempt to terminate the contract was not sufficient 
to warrant such termination. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 
On February 10, 1993, this matter came before the Third 
Circuit Court, Summit County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston 
presiding, for trial. The plaintiff was present and represented 
by her counsel, Brent A. Gold. The defendant was present and 
represented himself as a Pro Se defendant. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff substantially 
completed the interior design work and thereby the total design 
fee of $8,000.00 was due to plaintiff, minus the amount that the 
defendant had already paid plaintiff towards satisfaction of this 
amount. A judgment was entered on March 17, 1993, against 
defendant in the amount of $2,000.00 for design fees owed to the 
plaintiff. The defendant's counterclaims were dismissed upon the 
merits. Notice of Appeal was filed on April 12, 1993. 
VII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
WAS UNREASONABLE. 
It is well established that the trial court judge has the 
discretion to grant or deny motions for continuance and will not 
be reversed by the appellate court unless it is clear that the 
5 
court has abused its discretion by acting unreasonable* Hunt v. 
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990). 
In the case at bar, the appellant was not given a reasonable 
amount of notice regarding the trial date. Consequently, the 
appellant filed a motion for continuance which was granted, but 
was, in effect, a denial when the court offered a one week 
continuance on a date that appellant could not attend trial and 
the same date of February 10, 1993, that was previously the trial 
date set. Such conduct by the trial court judge was an abuse of 
discretion by not providing appellant reasonable alternative 
dates to continue the trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS WERE 
INAPPROPRIATE AND PRECLUDED DEPOSING APPELLEE. 
The trial court judge's lengthy, condescending statements 
and personal views as to the validity of taking the deposition of 
the appellee were inappropriate and, in effect, coerced appellant 
into not deposing appellee by threatening attorneys fees and 
costs against appellant. The trial court judge created an 
atmosphere of intimidation and inhibition in the courtroom and in 
effect denied appellant his fundamental due process right of 
having adequate time to prepare his defense through adequate 
discovery. 
III. REFUSAL TO ADMIT RELEVANT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REGARDING 
WORK PERFORMED TINDER THE AGREEMENT WAS ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETION. 
The trial court abused its discretion by not admitting 
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relevant extrinsic evidence offered by appellant at trial. 
Appellant offered extrinsic evidence that went to the very issue 
of substantial performance regarding the contract between the 
parties. Appellant offered into evidence documents that were 
prepared by Susan St. James which evidenced invoicing, billing 
dates, check numbers, dates of payments, room-by-room breakdowns 
of who actually located furnishings, and who actually arranged 
for the purchase of the furnishings. Unfortunately, due to 
technical malfunction of the recording equipment, Susan St. 
James1 testimony, appellant's motion to enter such evidence and 
his objections, appellee's attorney's objections to 
admissibility, and the courts denial of admission were not 
recorded and did not become part of the transcript. 
IV. and V, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in 
all actions tried on the merits without a jury, the court shall 
find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions 
of law. In order to determine whether the evidence adduced at 
trial supports the trial court's findings, the findings must 
provide sufficient detail and include facts to clearly show the 
evidence upon which they were grounded. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). The failure to enter adequate 
findings of fact to support material issues may be reversible 
error. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989) . 
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In the case at bar, the trial court's findings that the 
appellee substantially performed her obligations under the 
contract are not supported with sufficient specificity and 
adequate evidentiary support. In addition, the trial court 
interpreted the contract between the parties based solely on 
appellee's extrinsic evidence and did not admit relevant 
extrinsic evidence that went to the issue of substantial 
performance offered by the appellant. Therefore, the trial 
court's findings were not adequately supported by the evidence 
and do not accurately reflect the trial court's findings. 
VIII • 
ARGUMENT 
I, THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
WAS UNREASONABLE. 
The issue is whether the trial court's denial of appellant's 
Motion for a Continuance was unreasonable such that it was an 
abuse of discretion. Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 
(Utah 1978) . 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the 
trial courts with substantial discretion in deciding whether to 
grant continuances "upon good cause shown." Utah R. Civ. P. 
40(b) (1953 as amended 1987); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1990); Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 1992); Hardy v. 
Hardy. 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989). It is also well 
established that the trial judge's decision will not be reversed 
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by the appellate court unless it is clear that the court has 
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. Id. 
In determining whether to grant continuances, the court 
should examine the reasonableness of a request in light of the 
tradition that a party should be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial. Bairas v. Johnson, 
13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378 (1962); see Gonzales v. Harris. 
542 P.2d 842, 843-44 (Colo, 1975). The trial court should not 
prejudice the substantial rights of a party by forcing him to go 
to trial without being able to fairly present his case solely 
because of the court's legitimate concern for the prevention of 
delay in the trial of cases. Gonzales v. Harris, 542 P.2d at 
844; Yates v. Superior Court In and For City of Pima, 120 Ariz. 
436, 586 P.2d 997, 998 (Ariz. App. 1978). "One of the most 
important ingredients of due process is the time to prepare a 
defense." Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). 
Appellant contends that he was not given a reasonable amount 
of notice regarding the trial date. Notice of the trial hearing 
was not received by appellant until after the trial date was 
already set, due to the fact that he was out of the state 
conducting business at that time. As soon as he was notified of 
the trial date he filed his Motion for Request of Discovery and 
Motion for Continuance. 
It is appellant's contention that the trial court's offer of 
a one week continuance beyond the original trial date was, in 
effect, a denial of the Motion for a Continuance and was 
9 
unreasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. 
Appellant, because of previously scheduled business obligations, 
would be out of the state of Utah on the only offered date of 
February 17, 1993. Thus, appellant was not given an actual 
choice or afforded another date, but was limited to the original 
trial date of February 10, 1993. The trial court's failure to 
grant a continuance resulted in denying appellant sufficient time 
to perform discovery and adequately prepare his defense. 
Due to the fact that the trial court did not establish any 
cut-off date for discovery, appellant, as a pro se defendant1, 
did not have a time table to determine when discovery was to be 
completed in this case. For that reason, during the five (5) 
months that expired between the time appellant answered 
appellee's complaint until the filing of his Motion for 
Continuance, he did not commence discovery in the expectation 
that the court would give him, a pro se defendant, some notice as 
to the discovery cut-off date. In addition, appellant was hoping 
in good faith to settle the matter before it ever went to trial. 
Under these particular circumstances, the trial court's 
denial of appellant's Motion for a Continuance was unreasonable 
and inconsistent with substantial justice and, therefore, was an 
x
. Courts, as a general rule, have held that a party who 
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge 
and practice as any qualified member of the bar. Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). However, The Utah 
Supreme Court has cautioned that "because of his lack of 
technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting as his 
own attorney] should be accorded every consideration that may 
reasonably be indulged." Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch. 13 Utah 
2d 266, 268, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (1962). 
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abuse of its discretion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS WERE 
INAPPROPRIATE AND PRECLUDED DEPOSING APPELLEE. 
The issue is whether the trial court!s statements concerning 
possible repercussions resulting from appellant's decision to 
depose witnesses was improper and precluded appellant from 
deposing witnesses. 
Appellant contends that the trial judge's lengthy and 
condescending statements and personal views as to the validity of 
taking the deposition of the appellee in a $3,000 collections 
case were inappropriate and ultimately denied him the fundamental 
legal right to depose the appellee/plaintiff in this case, and 
thereby, denied him access to discoverable information to help 
him adequately prepare for trial. 
"One of the fundamental principles of due process is that 
all parties to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial 
judge. VA fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process.1" Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874, 
877 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of 
Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)); see Bunnell v. Industrial 
Com'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987). "Fairness 
requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to 
prevent even the possibility of unfairness." Id. "The right to 
an impartial judge embraces a defendant's right to present and 
conduct his own defense unhampered by the judge's idea of what 
that defense should be or how it should proceed." State v. 
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Rhodes, 224 S.E.2d 631, 638 (N.C. 1976). 
The Court's review of the record in Bunnell, showed that the 
administrative law judge ("ALJ") conducted the hearing in an 
unacceptable manner that was sufficiently unfair as to constitute 
a denial of plaintiff's constitutional right to a fair hearing. 
The ALJ created an atmosphere where witnesses were inhibited and 
intimidated by the judges conduct, and felt defensive; the ALJ 
interfered with the plaintiff's counsel's ability to make a 
record or argue the evidence; and the judge gave the appearance 
of having decided the case without even considering the medical 
records. Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333. 
In the case at bar# the judge's statements and demeanor, 
although an attempt to merely educate the pro se defendant, had 
the effect of discouraging and persuading appellant from actually 
deposing the appellee and effectively denied appellant the legal 
right to depose the appellee, thereby, denying him access to 
discoverable information that would have helped him adequately 
prepare for trial. See Transcripts of Hearing, January 27, 1993. 
The trial judge's coraments went far beyond the realm of informing 
or educating appellant. They in fact deterred appellant from 
deposing the appellee for fear of reprisal in the form of 
attorneys fees and costs against him. See Transcript of Hearing, 
January 27, 1993, p.18, lines 13-14. Such conduct was 
unreasonable. Thus, the trial court erred in its attempted 
explanation of the rules and abused its discretion in that 
regard. The trial court's conduct denied appellant right of due 
12 
process in this case by not affording him sufficient time or 
means to prepare an adequate defense. 
The judge in this case created an atmosphere of intimidation 
and inhibition. Like the ALJ in Bunnell, the judge would 
abruptly cut-off appellant's attempt to object or express his 
disagreement with the trial court's purported explanation of 
sanctions. See Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 1993, p.13 
lines 11-15, pp. 15-16. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, appellant asks this Court 
to find that the trial court's statements regarding sanctions for 
deposing appellee were inappropriate and ultimately denied 
appellant the fundamental right of due process of having adequate 
time to prepare his defense. 
Ill, REFUSAL TO ADMIT RELEVANT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REGARDING 
WORK PERFORMED UNDER THE AGREEMENT WAS ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETION. 
The issue involved is whether the trial court's decision not 
to admit appellant's documentary evidence of work performed by 
both parties to the contract was an abuse of discretion. 
Marshall v. Van Geruen. 790 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
Appellant contends that the trial court did in fact abuse 
its discretion by not admitting relevant documentary evidence 
that went to the very issue of substantial performance. However, 
because of technical difficulties, there is no record of the 
discussion and testimony between the parties and the court 
regarding the exclusion of appellant's documentary evidence. 
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"An admissibility decision is the "sum of several rulings, 
each of which may be reviewed under a separate standard.1" State 
v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App. 1993)(quoting State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993))- This Appellate Court 
in Horton, applied two standards of review in determining whether 
the trial court properly excluded a witness1 affidavit: a 
correction of error standard to the legal content of the trial 
court's ruling not to admit the affidavit, Id.; see Thurman at 
1268-72; and an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the 
trial court's ruling, pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Horton, at 713. 
In reviewing the legal content, the Court will examine (1) 
whether the trial court selected the correct rule of evidence, 
(2) whether the trial court correctly interpreted that rule, and 
(3) whether the trial court correctly applied the rule. Id. 
Applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial 
court's ruling, pursuant to Rule 804(b) (5)2, the Court will 
examine whether the probative value of the evidence in question 
lule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
^ statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
:ircumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [will not 
be excluded] if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. 
14 
outweighs the probative value of other evidence on point. Id. 
For rulings requiring a balancing of factors an abuse of 
discretion or reasonability is the appropriate standard of 
review. Id.; see Thurman at 1270 n. 11; see also State v. 
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985). 
During appellant's direct examination of Ms. Susan St. James 
("St. James"), appellant offered into evidence documents that 
were prepared by St. James which evidenced invoicing, billing 
dates, check numbers, dates of payments, room-by-room breakdowns 
of who actually located the needed furnishings, and who actually 
arranged for the purchase of the furnishings involved in this 
case. Unfortunately, due to technical difficulties with the 
recording equipment, St. James' testimony, appellant's motion to 
enter such documentary evidence into the case and his objections, 
appellee's attorney's objections to admissibility, and the courts 
denial of admission were not recorded and did not become part of 
the transcript. See Exhibit J (Index and page 30). Such 
testimony and documentation were crucial in appellant's attempt 
to show the court that there was in fact no substantial 
performance on the part of the appellee. See Exhibit G. A 
review of the Summary Report indicates that the appellee 
performed only twenty-three percent (23%) of all the items 
(includes both old furnishings and purchase of new items) 
required by the agreement and only twenty-nine percent (29%) of 
the new items (includes only new items purchased) required by the 
agreement. See Exhibit G, page 4. Based upon the Summary 
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Report of performance regarding the agreement by both parties, it 
is apparent that appellant performed a good portion of the work 
that was required by the agreement. Consequently, it is 
appellant's contention that appellee performed only seventy-five 
percent (75%) of her obligation under the agreement. The Summary 
Report goes into detail regarding which party performed what 
functions under the agreement. This Summary Report was, in fact, 
of probative value to the very issue at hand, that is, 
substantial performance. Consequently, appellant asks this court 
to find that the trial court's decision to not admit such 
relevant documentary evidence was improper and an abuse of 
discretion. 
IV, and V, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OP FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The issues are whether the trial court's theory and grounds 
for determining that appellant unjustifiably terminated the 
contract between the parties was proper and whether the trial 
court's findings were accurate. 
The appropriate standards of review are that (1) the trial 
court's interpretation of a contract is not entitled to any 
particular weight on appeal, where the court interprets contract 
as matter of law without regard for extrinsic evidence. Baker v. 
Western Sur. Co.. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); and (2) the 
trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they "are against the clear weight of the evidence", or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite or firm 
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conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Appellant contests the trial court's findings that the 
appellee substantially performed her obligations under the 
contract and contends that the trial courts findings of fact lack 
sufficient specificity and adequate evidentiary support. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: that "[i]n 
all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. ..." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a)(as amended Jan. 1, 1987). The Utah Supreme and 
Appellate Courts "consistently stress" the importance of adequate 
"findings of fact." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah 
App. 1991). The failure to enter adequate findings of fact on 
material issues may be reversible error. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); see also Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, Corp., 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). To succeed in 
challenging the findings, appellant must prove they are clearly 
erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence. Reid 
v. Mutual, 776 P.2d at 899-901; Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 
P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 
477 (Utah App. 1991). "Therefore, if we are to determine whether 
the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial courtfs 
findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and include 
enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which 
they are grounded." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 477. 
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Meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually 
impossible absent adequate findings of fact. Id.; see State v. 
Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990). 
In order to mount a successful challenge to the 
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact the evidence 
supporting the findings must be marshalled in order to 
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989). The following is the evidence admitted at trial: 
the appellee was to provide interior decorating services to 
appellant and St. James; appellee agreed to provide those 
services over a twelve month period, beginning July 1, 1991 and 
ending June 30, 1992; appellee agreed to payment of $2,000 per 
quarter for a total of $8,000; appellee agreed to assist in all 
decisions and in the purchase of furniture and accessories for 
the home; appellee was out of town frequently as a flight 
attendant; appellee assisted in the purchase of approximately 
$30,000 worth of furnishings for the home; appellee was paid 
$6,000 for services rendered; appellant was frustrated by 
appellees performance and unavailability. 
Appellant challenges the court's findings in that it 
refused to hear or admit testimonial and documentary evidence 
through his witness, St. James. This evidence would have shown 
the amount of services that was provided over the eight month 
period for which the appellee was paid $6,000. It would have 
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shown that appellant and St. James had to do the majority of the 
work for which appellee was paid. The trial court, by its 
decisions and statements made, appears to have concluded early on 
that appellee was being paid for having obtained $30,000 worth of 
furnishings and nothing more. Each time appellant attempted to 
explain his reasoning for wanting to present his evidence, to 
prove the insufficiency of the appellee*s services, the trial 
judge would cut him off stating that the evidence was irrelevant 
to the type of contract that he believed it to be. Due to the 
conclusory nature of the trial court's findings of fact, the 
marshalling of facts in this case will largely be ineffectual. 
See woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 477. In Woodward, the 
Appellate Court stated: 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to 
marshal the evidence when the findings are so 
inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged 
as factual determinations. . . . [W]here the findings 
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go through 
a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can 
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's 
findings as framed. 
Id. Although, the trial court's findings of fact in Woodward. 
constituted three full pages of text, they nonetheless provided 
an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the court's 
ultimate decision. Id. 
In this case at bar, it appears that the trial court 
interpreted the agreement between the parties as a matter of law 
without regard to the relevant extrinsic evidence that appellant 
tried to enter into evidence. "If the trial court interprets a 
contract as a matter of law without regard for extrinsic 
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evidence, we afford its interpretation no particular weight." 
Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988); 
see Seashores Inc. v. Hancey. 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987). In our case, although it was clear that the trial court 
did look at the appellee's extrinsic evidence, the trial court 
did not consider the appellant!s extrinsic evidence that went to 
the very heart of substantial performance, (i.e., billing 
statements, check #'s, work performed). 
Although the agreement between appellant and appellee 
was a verbal agreement, it was memorialized by appellant, to 
which appellee acquiesced. As such it has been held to be 
legally binding. The trial judge stated that it was his duty to 
hear testimony as to what agreement the parties understood they 
were entering into and to interpret the terms of that agreement. 
"The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what 
the parties intended by looking at the entire contract and all 
its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and 
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Appellant 
contends that the trial court did not read the memorialized 
agreement in its entirety. It would seem that had the judge read 
the agreement more carefully he would have allowed the admission 
of evidence that would have contradicted the trial court's 
conclusion that the appellee substantially performed. 
Based on these arguments, appellant asks this Court to 
find that trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are not supported by the evidence and do not accurately reflect 
20 
the trial court!s findings. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is apparent that the 
appellant did not, in fact, receive a fair trial, thereby denying 
him a fundamental principle of due process. The trial court 
erred when it refused to grant appellant a reasonable amount of 
time to prepare an adequate defense, made improper statements 
that inhibited the appellants right to discovery, failed to 
admit relevant extrinsic evidence that went to the very issue of 
substantial performance and made findings that were not supported 
by the evidence. The trial court's conduct regarding these 
matters did not provide appellant with his fundamental due 
process right of a fair trial on the merits. 
Consequently, the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed and/or remanded to the trial court to be tried to an 
impartial jury in the interest of justice. 
DATED this *-/£" day of January, 1994. 
Kerjneth Allen 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this 5 ^ day of January, 1994, I hereby certify that I 
mailed by first-class, postage-prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the attached APPELLANT!S BRIEF to the following: 
Brent A. Gold 
333 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1994 
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P.O. Box 1059 
Park City, Ut. 84060 
801-649-6477 Fax: 801-649-6470 
August 14, 1991 
Yvonne M. Gillham 
Concepts West Interiors 
P.O. Box 2813 
Park City, Utah 
Ms. Gillham: 
This letter Is to confirm my understanding regarding our agreement for 
your providing interior decorating services to Susan and I regarding our 
new home at 218 Golden Eagle Dr. Park City. Utah. 
The basic term of the agreement is one year beginning July 1, 1991 and 
ending June 30, 1992. We will pay you a total of $8,000.00 payable 
$2,000.00 each quarter at the end of each quarter with the first payment 
being due on September 30, 1991. You have agreed to assist in all of our 
decisions and in the purchase of furniture and accessories for the home at 
vour cost. 
If you have any additions or questions please contact me at your 
convenience. 
Susan and I already appreciate your assistance and look forward to 
pleasant and fun experience sharing our .new home with you. 
Respectfully, 




Donald E. Armstrong 
P.O. Box 1059 
Park City, Utah, 84060 
Telephone: 801-649-6477 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
YVONNE GILLHAM, d.b.a. 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 923000086 CV 
) Judge: Roger A. Livingston 
TO PLAINTIFF, YVONNE GILLHAM, dba CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, AND HER 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, BRENT A. GOLD. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant, Donald E. Armstrong, is 
filing an appeal in the above case. 
Dated this 12 day of April, 1993 
Donald E. Armstrong, 
Defendant 
3RD CIRCUIT COURT - PARK' 
m/12/93 TIME: 15:88 CLERK': 
CASE: 323000086CV 
PLAINTIFF: GILLHAM: YVONNE 
DEFENDANT. ARMSTRONG'.. HONALI' E 
PAV'OR: HONALI/ E. ARMSTRONG 
Ami. Received: Civil Fees NO: S39 Check • 
Receipt No: S'38£4000S 
JUDGE: LIVINGSTON; ROGER A. 
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FAX 
Short Title of Case: GILLHAM VS ARMSTRONG 
MUNICIPAL COURT CIVIL NO: 923000086 CV 
I, am employed in the Summit County, State of Utah, I am over the 
age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business 
address is: 
218 Golden Eagle Drive 
P.O. Box 1059 
Park City, Utah 84060 
On the date referred to below, I served the following document(s): 
Notice Of Appeal 
by placing a true copy thereof, in the fax machine, and 
addressed as follows: 
Brent Gold Fax #649-8412 
P.O. Box 1994 
Park City, Utah 84060 
I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of 
Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on April 13, 1993 
[UakLM^jA^Mjyi 
c 
BRENT A. GOLD, 1213 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
333 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1994 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801) 649-8406 
RECEIVED 
MAR 1 7 1993 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 923000086 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came on before the 
Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Circuit Court Judge, on Wednesday, 
the 10th day of February, 1993, in Park City, Summit County, State 
of Utah. The plaintiff, Yvonne Gillham, dba Concepts West 
Interiors, was present and represented by her counsel, Brent A. 
Gold. The defendant, Donald E. Armstrong, was present and 
represented himself. 
The Court, having heard the sworn testimony of plaintiff and 
defendant and witnesses called by each party, and having reviewed 
and examined the evidence and exhibits submitted by the respective 
parties and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now herewith makes and enters judgment for and 
in behalf of the plaintiff. 
IT IS HEREWITH ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS 
Yvonne Gillham, dba Concepts West Interiors, plaintiff in the 
above-entitled matter, is herewith granted judgment as against the 
defendant Donald E. Armstrong as follows: 
!• Judgment in the amount of $2,000.00 for design fees owed 
to the plaintiff is herewith granted to the plaintiff as against 
said defendant. 
2. Judgment for sales tax owed by defendant to plaintiff in 
the amount of $1,925.00 is not granted to plaintiff as against said 
defendant, for the reason that said amount was voluntarily paid at 
the conclusion of the trial. No interest or penalties as may be 
assessed- by the Utah State Tax Commission are awarded to the 
plaintiff on said sales tax amount. Payment by the defendant of 
said $1,925.00 to the plaintiff at the conclusion of trial between 
the parties sljLall constitute satisfaction ofand be in lieu of said 
judgment amount. No interest is awarded to plaintiff in connection 
with said amount. 
3. Plaintiff is hereby awarded Judgment as against defendant 
in the amount of $76.83 for costs expended by plaintiff. 
4. Plaintiff is further awarded Judgment against the 
defendant for accrued interest from and after July 7, 1992 on all 
of the amounts set forth in paragraphs 1 and 3 above, as follows: 
(a) Pre-judgment interest on all of the above-said 
amounts at the rate of 10% per annum until Judgment is entered or 
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until paid; and 
(b) Post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum 
from and after entry of Judgment until paid in full. 
5. The defendant is to take nothing by reason of his 
counterclaims, and the same are hereby dismissed upon the merits. 
DATED this//cxA^ day of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT \ ^ ^ ^ 
• ST/ir,->, ( i — y ; 
f-r-Jy" *,'>- \ ^  Roger A. Livingston 
z?^' [^~ •'  *; Circuit Court Judge 
— «r 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Donald E. Armstrong 
P. 0. Box 1059 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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BRENT A. GOLD, 1213 
Attorney for Plaintiff MAR ] g 1993 
333 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1994 THIRD CIRCUIT C O N P T 
Park City, Utah 84060 ?AnK C{ i"Y D!l"°As70cVn 
Telephone: (801) 649-8406 " l"-"' 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 923000086 
i Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came on before the 
Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Circuit Court Judge, on Wednesday, 
the 10th dayfof February, 1993, in Park City, Summit County, State 
of Utah. The plaintiff, Yvonne Gillham, dba Concepts West 
Interiors, was present and was represented by her counsel, Brent A. 
Gold. The defendant, Donald E. Armstrong, was present and 
represented himself. 
The Court, having heard the sworn testimony of plaintiff and 
defendant and witnesses as called by each party, and having 
reviewed and examined the evidence and exhibits submitted by the 
respective parties, and being fully advised in the premises, does 
now make and adopt the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff is a resident of and is licensed to do 
business as an interior designer in Park City, Summit County, State 
of Utah. 
2. The defendant owns a home and property in Park City, 
Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. That all services rendered by the plaintiff and 'all 
matters and agreements related to this matter were entered into and 
occurred in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah. 
4. The amount in controversy and claimed by the defendant in 
this matter is less than $20,000.00. 
5. On or about August 14, 1991, an agreement was entered 
into between plaintiff and defendant whereby plaintiff was to 
perform interior decorating services for defendant at his heme 
located in Park City, Utah. 
6. The agreement between the parties was in writing and was 
prepared solely and exclusively by the defendant. 
7. The agreement of August 14, 1991 between the parties was 
preceded by approximately 10 months of periodic consultation and 
negotiation between plaintiff and defendant. 
Q. By reason of those negotiations and consultations, the 
defendant was fully advised of plaintiff's job as a flight 
attendant and the time constraints upon plaintiff, and availability 
of plaintiff by reason of said job as a flight attendant. 
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9. The contract between plaintiff and aefendant provided 
that plaintiff would be paid a design fee in the amount of 
$8,000.00 for her services, and that said design fee would be paid 
by way of $2,000.00 quarterly payments with the first payment being 
due on September 30, 1991. 
10. Further, the contract between the parties provided that 
the defendant would pay for the purchase of furniture and 
accessories obtained by the plaintiff at cost. 
11. At the commencement of, or prior to the agreement between 
the parties, the plaintiff had informed the defendant that her work 
could be completed in approximately eight months. 
12. The work to be performed by the plaintiff was 
substantially completed by the end of March, 1992. 
13. Notwithstanding interpersonal disputes and disagreements 
that arose between plaintiff and defendant, the defendant 
acknowledged that the work performed by the plaintiff and the 
furniture and furnishings obtained by the plaintiff were of 
acceptable types, kinds and quality. 
14. On or before June 30, 1992, the defendant had paid 
plaintiff the amount of $30,801.32 for the furniture and furnishing 
packages that had been provided by the plaintiff. 
15. The defendant failed and refused to pay to the plaintiff 
Utah state sales tax upon the furniture package purchase price, 
which sales tax was in the amount of $1,925.00. 
16. Sales tax in the amount of $1,925.00 was a cost of the 
plaintiff pursuant to the agreement between the parties. Plaintiff 
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demanded payment of sales tax by the defendant, and defendant 
refused payment of said sales tax amount. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the defendant fully and completely acknowledged that the 
sales tax amount was in fact owed to the plaintiff, and in presence 
of the Court, the defendant made payment to the plaintiff of the 
full $1,925.00 sales tax amount. 
17. On or before June 30, 1992, defendant had paid to 
plaintiff $6,000.00 of the $8,000.00 design fee that was ovjed 
plaintiff pursuant to the contract between the parties. 
18. Despite requests and demands from the plaintiff that the 
balance of the design fee in the amount of $2,000.00 be paid by the 
defendant, the defendant failed and refused to pay said remaining 
balance. 
19. The defendant claims that during the latter portion of 
March, 1992, he attempted to terminate the agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant by sending a notice of such termination to 
the plaintiff. Defendant admits that he did not mail the notice of 
termination and alleges that his secretary mailed the letter to 
plaintiff. Defendant's secretary did not attend trial and did not 
testify. 
20. Plaintiff alleges that she never received the letter of 
termination in March or April of 1992, and did not see the letter 
until a copy was supplied by the defendant in August of 1992. 
21. The work to be performed by the plaintiff in any event 
was completed by late March or early April of 1992. Performance by 
the plaintiff was timely and in accord with the contract between 
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the parties. 
22. The plaintiff continued to communicate with defendant and 
defendant's wife during April and May of 1992, and was not]informed 
by them of any termination. 
23. On or about July 7, 1992, the plaintiff provided 
defendant final billing for work performed by her, which billing 
included request for payment of the remaining balance of $2,000.00 
of the design fee and sales tax in the amount of $1,925.00 owed to 
the State of Utah. 
24. Defendant failed and refused to pay said amounts. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters its Conclusions of Law. 
1. The Court in this matter has full and complete 
jurisdiction, both over the parties and over plaintiff's cause of 
action. 
2. Th.at a qood and valid written contract was entered into 
between the parties on or about August 14, 1991. 
3. The letter dated August 14, 1991, which memorialized the 
agreement between the parties was prepared solely and exclusively 
by the defendant, and accordingly any ambiguities in the agreement 
should be and are construed as against the drafter of the document. 
4. The agreement between the parties provided that the 
plaintiff was to be paid a design fee of $8,000.00, . with said 
amount to be paid by quarterly installments, with the first 
installment due on September 30, 1991. 
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5. The agreement between the parties further provided that 
the defendant is to pay all costs of furniture and accessories 
obtained by the plaintiff for the defendant. 
6- As a matter of law, the sales tax amount of $1,925.00 
assessed as against the purchase price for the furniture and 
furnishings provided by the plaintiff is a cost to be paid by the 
defendant under the agreement between the parties. 
7 . In breach and violation of the agreement between the 
parties, the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff the final 
$2,000.00 of the design fee owed to the plaintiff, and also failed 
to pay the $1,925.00 sales tax amount to the plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff's performance under the agreement between tie 
parties was fully and satisfactorily performed pursuant to the 
agreement between the parties. 
9. Whatever attempts that were made by the defendant to 
terminate the contract in the latter portion of March, 1992, were 
unilateral in nature, untimely, and occurred after the plaintiff 
had already substantially performed under her agreement with the 
defendant. Defendant's attempt to terminate the contract was not 
based upon facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant any such 
termination. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant in 
the following amounts: 
a. $2,000.00 for balance of design fee owed to 
plaintiff. 
b. $1,925.00 owed as sales tax owed to the State of 
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Utah. Payment by the defendant of said $1,925.00 to the plaintiff 
at conclusion of trial shall constitute satisfaction of said 
judgment amount. 
c. Plaintiff is to be awarded her costs as may be duly 
verified in accord with Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
d. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of 10% per annum 
upon the above-said amount, after July 7, 1992 until Judgment is 
entered or until paid; and post-judgment interest in the amount of 
12% per annum upon the above-said amounts from and after entry of 
Judgment until paid. 
11. The defendant is to take nothing by reason of his 
counterclaims and the same are to be dismissed upon the merits. 
12. No judgment is to be awarded the plaintiff for any 
interest or penalty that may be assessed by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
13. No attorney fees are awarded to either plaintiff or 
defendant. The Court determines that there was no bad faith 
sufficient to justify awarding of such fees. 
Judgment is to be awarded plaintiff consistent with the above 
and foregoing. ^ 
DATED this / / da^^af March, 199-3/* 
fotger" K. JL-ivingston, iTcudbt-<fourt fcruc&je 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
c> 
I hereby certify that on this *• ^  day of March, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law was mailed by U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Donald E. Armstrong 
P. 0. Box 1059 
Park City, Utah 84060 
L-rs. ...CU\( c-,..^  
8 
E 
Donald E. Armstrong 
P.O. Box 1059 
Park City, Utah, 84060 
Telephone: 801-649-6477 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
YVONNE GILLHAM, d.b.a. 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOF 
) REQUEST FOR CONTINUATION OF 
) TRIAL 
) Civil No. 923000086 CV 
) Judge: Roger A. Livingston 
TO PLAINTIFF, YVONNE GILLHAM, dba CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, AND HER 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, BRENT A. GOLD. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Q /njltr^/tfor as soon thereafter 
as may be heard in the Third Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Summit 
County, Park City Department, Donald E. Armstrong, defendant, by his 
signature below, hereby requests a hearing in the above case to continue 
the trial and to complete discovery. 
This motion is made pursuant to Utah Rules of Civii Procedure 7 and 
40. Rule 40 states that the Court can continue a trial at it's discretion. 
Defendant represents to the Court the following items for the Court to 
consider: 
1. That defendant has not had reasonable time to pursue 
discovery and that additional time is. required to complete discovery. 
2. That defendant believes it will take approximately 90 days to 
complete said discovery subject to the cooperation of the Plaintiff and of 
Defendant's ability to discover the necessary documents. It is 
contemplated that Plaintiff can provide most documents but in the event 
Plaintiff resists, Defendant may have to seek other sources for the 
necessary documents. 
3. Defandant is now serving notice to Plaintiff of taking 
Plaintiff's deposition, a Request for documents and a Request for 
Admissions (Copies attached). 
4. Estimated time for trial is one to two days. 
Defendant requests a continuance of this trial until after May 1, 1993. 
This motion is based upon this notice of motion and motion. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 1993 
Donald E. Armstrong, 
Defendant 
F 
Kenneth Allen (6162) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone:(801) 322-2458 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUSAN ST. JAMES 
CIVIL NO. 930236-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) ss 
SUSAN ST. JAMES ("Affiant")/ being first duly sworn upon her 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant was called as a witness for appellant at the 
February 10, 1993, trial in the above referenced case. 
2. That a good portion of my testimony by way of direct 
examination by appellant which began on page thirty (30) of the 
trial transcript was omitted. That the entire swearing in, 
several questions and answers were not recorded. 
3. That appellant asked me on direct examination, 
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questions about the relationship with appellee and the problems 
that arose. 
4. That during my direct examination by appellant, the 
appellant attempted to introduce some documentation that I had 
prepared which evidenced invoicing, billing dates, check numbers, 
dates of payments, room by room breakdowns, who actually located 
the needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the 
purchase of the furnishings regarding this case. 
5. That the testimony that I gave was material to the 
issue of substantial performance in this case. My testimony 
would have supported appellants claim that appellee in fact did 
not substantially perform her obligation in locating and 
arranging for the purchase of furnishings pursuant to our 
agreement. 
6. That appellee's attorney objected to the admissibility 
of such documentation and that the trial court judge sustained 
appellee1s objection and appellant was not allowed to admit such 
documentation into evidence. 
7. That such portion of my testimony did in fact take 
place at the trial on February 10, 1993, but was omitted from the 
transcript due to the audio recording equipment not functioning 
at that particular time. 
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8. That attached to this affidavit is the actual 
documentation that appellant attempted to admit into evidence at 
the February 10, 1993, trial during my direct examination, 
DATED this I day of November, 1993. 
Susan St. James 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by SUSAN 
ST. JAMES on this r*^ day of November, 1993. 
jliLu. (n i&UvUX 
fi&. .u^ar*-,-;. N o t a r y P u b l i c 
V^tT* / "^  ^ ornm,ssion E o^sros 





Amount Due Date Paid 
Yvonne Bills 
Check # Amount Paid Comments 
#170 
#112 (Invoice Really Confusing) 
Wjlh Cover Letter I 
8 / 1 4 / 9 1 $162.00 
$2,000.00 
8 / 1 4 / 9 1 




$ 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
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.provide documentation lor all transactions. ~ $ W j t ^ < W n f (\&-prn ***& n 






[we were concerned about this, we discussed it. d i d | ^ l l ^ nrV*^-tfv«; 
Pkg. #1 
No Purchase orders 
Statement of Account pg. 
1 1 /14/91 $3,428.80 Nothing Due - This was merely a 
n . . . Statement of account for that date. 





1 2 / 1 5 / 9 1 
1 2 / 1 7 / 9 1 
$2,000.00 
$2,542.28 
12 /17 /91 
12 /17 /91 
1 /7 /92 
1 /17 /92 
2 / 4 / 9 2 $1,042.55 2 i 1 4 / 9 2 
Revised Pkg. #1 1 1 /17 /92 
^jrniture Handwritten St\tc% 
Revised: statement 
jf Acc't. Furniture Pkp. #1 
jta'Tecnent o f A c c t ^ f g f o f t z - 2 / 4 / 9 2 " $1,724.37 2 / 1 4 / 9 2 
Note Tflfere are 2 page_5sJhe.Jlcst,one. shows $1200 Deposiffchte: 
he"Second shows $1724.37 due In handwriting, 




167 $877 .63 
At this time we were moving into our i 
house about 2 months ahead of schedule. 
Yvonne was gone alot. I had to call various 
^companies to^see where the orders stood. 
DesigrTPees 
^6 (\Ctt>^af\ M* 
Ufih I fyoYtUA^ Z 
4CL<JC\^ i*jUiO$ Ufa 
£%xd-
2 0 2 $1 ,724.37 
This was such a mess it took hours to go over 
with the purchase orders. 












4 / 9 / 9 2 
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Paid 5 days advance by MarlenaVWith ftt/w- S . . > r 
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1 Collee Table 
2 Lamps 
Fabric 





































































Comp le te 
C o m m e n t s 
P rob lems 






































First Guest Bedroom 
Bed & Head Board 
2 nite tables 
Chest of Drawers 
Bedding 
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33 three of four words missing- not talking into mike -
only one track 
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79 couldn't understand him 
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5 away from mike 
12 "Unidentified Speaker" - I couldn't tell if it was 
Mr. Gold or Mr. Armstrong 

























P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Gold and Mr. Armstrong, why don't you 
both come forward for a minute. 
Okay. I now—I have received some corrected Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and I want to just go through 
those very quickly and make certain that they comport with the 
Court's ruling. And then either or both of you can do what 
you choose to do with that. 
Let's turn to the Findings of Fact first. Do you 
have a copy of those, Mr. Armstrong? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes. Your Honor, could I just say 
one thing. I wrote Mr. Gold a letter based on our last hear-
ing here. And there are very little changes between this 
second version and the first version. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GOLD: If it helps, Your Honor, I could point out 
specifically the paragraphs of the findings that have— 
THE COURT: Well, I made some pencil changes on my 
old—on the old copy. Okay, on Finding of Fact No. 7, I 
wanted extensive change to periodic. I believe the testimony 
would be fairly characterized there were period consultations. 
Whether it was extensive or minimal, I—there was some 
variance in the testimony but there was some period consulta-
tion. That change was made and then on paragraph 8 the words 


























Then with respect to the $1,925, that—paragraphs 15 
and 16 have been altered by putting as a finding of fact, "At 
the conclusion of the trial the defendant fully and completely 
acknowledged that the sales was in fact owed to the plaintiff 
in the presence of the Court. The defendant made payment to 
the plaintiff of the full $1,925 sales amount." So, that is 
reflected, rather than having that reflected in the judgment. 
Okay. Then I also reguested that in—on paragraph 22 
that we insert the word "orally"—"that plaintiff continued to 
communicate with defendant and defendant's wife during April 
1992 and was not orally informed by them of"— 
MR. GOLD: That was not inserted, Your Honor. I have 
no objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Armstrong, by interlineation 
I'm just going to insert the word "orally." I believe that 
when you and I talked briefly about those findings I told you 
that I did not make a specific finding as to whether or not 
that letter was mailed, delivered or whatever. The finding 
was that it was not orally informed. Indeed, I indicate in 
the findings it didn't—my oral ruling that it didn't matter 
whether that letter was delivered or not, it would make no 
difference because of the timeliness of it. The work had 
essentially been completed. 
Then on the Conclusions of Law, I had suggested to 


























same thing to both of you—that paragraph 9 needed to be 
changed. 
MR. GOLD: That was changed, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Right. And we inserted the words "what-
ever attempts were made by defendant." And, again, 
understand, both of you, that I didn't make a finding whether 
the letter was sent or not. There was competing testimony 
whether it was sent or received. But whatever attempts were 
made by the defendant to terminate the contract in the latter 
portion of 1992 were unilateral in nature, untimely, and 
occurred after the plaintiff had already substantially 
performed under her agreement with the defendant. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I think the last sentence there, 
there's been no discussion ever of anything like that that I 
remember. 
THE COURT: The last sentence? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: In the 9 that I have. 
THE COURT: "Defendant's attempt to terminate the 
contract was not based upon facts and circumstances sufficient 
to warrant any such termination." Well, that's really—it's a 
little bit redundant but that's not my finding. Is that—if 
it were opposite of that, I would rule in your favor. But 
they were—that did not terminate—that did not contemplate a 
termination of the contract. Indeed, because it was already 


























I did want No. 10(b) delineated—why are we leaving 
the judgment and then satisfying it? 
MR. GOLD: Your Honor, let me explain that. It was 
changed from the way that it was set forth (inaudible). And 
it was changed—"Payment of the $1,925 to the plaintiff at the 
conclusion of trial constitutes satisfaction of said judgment 
amount." And the reason that I think it's imperative that it 
be left in there i s — 
THE COURT: That's to avoid your hassle with the 
State Tax Commission as far a s — 
MR. GOLD: The State Tax Commission and not only 
that, Mr. Armstrong has indicated that he may well appeal. 
And I think it's very important to note that except for the 
payment of the money at the time— 
THE COURT: Well, I think the important thing is the 
judgment only be for the correct amount and not for the 
$1,925. 
MR. GOLD: That's right. The judgment reflects 
exactly the same thing, that the $1,925 is fully and 
completely satisfied. No judgment, including interest, 
penalties of any kind, are related to the $1,925. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Armstrong, what specific objec-
tion do you have, then, with the—it appears that Mr. Gold has 
in fact corrected and modified his previously submitted 


























objections do you have to either the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions or the separate judgment form? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, first of all, the last hear-
ing—both the trial and at the hearing where Mr. Gold wasn't 
present, you specifically wanted the $1,925 not included here 
and now we've changed that again. I don't understand that. 
I don't, you know, want a judgment (a) for any "more 
than it should be and all this discussion of it, and (b) that 
that is specifically against what you had said twice. 
Mr. Gold has changed things around and then he's added things 
back in, like the second sentence. And if I'm going to 
appeal, then— 
THE COURT: What second sentence of what? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I'm talking about that one you just 
read. Defendant admits—let's see, wait. 
THE COURT: Where are you? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I'm trying to find it. In the—at 
the hearing where, again, Mr. Gold wasn't here, the word you 
wanted in one of those paragraphs was "some consultation," not 
"periodic" or "extensive." There was two meetings. 
THE COURT: Well, I direct Mr. Gold to do periodic. 
In fact, that's what I wrote on the—on my corrected copy. 
Okay, do you have any objection, then? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, I'm looking. 


























MR. ARMSTRONG: Paragraph 19—no, I'm sorry, that's 
that same—paragraph 9 of the—we've already talked about— 
conclusion of law. "Defendant's attempt to terminate the 
contract was not based upon"—I don't understand why it needs 
to be in there, that was never discussed. I guess I feel like 
there was testimony at the trial that—it was pretty even. 
And most of Mr. Gold's position is in here and my position 
isn't and he's taken some things out to comply with you and 
then he adds sentences back in to cover it again. He's got 
the tax— 
THE COURT: Mr. Armstrong, I know you don't like the 
ruling. That's what the Court of Appeals is for. Go appeal 
me, if that's what you want to do. But I ruled against you. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I understand, but this— 
THE COURT: And that sentence, "Defendant's attempt 
to terminate the contract was not based upon fact and circum-
stances sufficient to warrant any such termination," is 
exactly what I ruled. If it were not that, then you would 
have won. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Okay. 
THE COURT: What's the legal objection to that? I 
say you don't like—you don't like the answer but that's 
different— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: No, no, what I'm saying is that isn't 


























made that first sentence and you did specifically say you 
didn't want sales tax in there and now Mr. Gold wants it in 
there and— 
THE COURT: Let's deal with one issue at a time, 
Mr. Armstrong, and this is—you know, I have, frankly, dealt 
with this to the point of adnauseum and I think—I want to end 
it. Now, number one, that second sentence, frankly, I'm not 
sure that it even adds anything to the first sentence. But it 
is not in an accurate statement. A conclusion of law is 
whatever attempt that you made to terminate the contract, it 
was not based upon the facts and circumstances sufficient to 
warrant such termination, i.e., it was not—even if made, as 
you argued, that it was not done in a timely way. It would a 
prospective, not a retroactive termination. 
And I have, you know, stated that repeatedly. It 
does not diminish—Mr. Gold, I'm not sure it adds anything, 
either. I mean, so what if it's there, I guess, is what I'm 
saying. That is my ruling and it was not in his first draft 
and it's in that one. Do you care if it's in it, Mr. Gold? 
MR. GOLD: I think I want it in there because on an 
appeal, that is the ultimate conclusion. I think the first 
part is specific. The last sentence is a statement— 
THE COURT: It's the "thus," I suppose. That is 
what—I know you disagree with the ruling, but that's what the 



























Now, with respect to the $1,200, however—or $1,925, 
Mr. Gold, I don't think there's any question that 
Mr. Armstrong paid that to you in court with the firm under-
standing that that was not to be a judgment. That was paid in 
lieu of a judgment being entered. That was paid that day. 
MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, here is what I would 
have to say in connection with that. If there is an appeal in 
this matter, I think it's very important to note that had he 
not paid that amount, there would have been a judgment. 
THE COURT: Sure, and that's clear from the Findings 
of Fact. There's no question about that. 
MR. GOLD: All right. So, if he goes in and he makes 
some—without reference that that was the Court's conclusion— 
I mean, he should pay the $1,925 if there was a full 
acknowledgment. 
THE COURT: Yeah. There's no question that's in 
there. But, still, in the judgment form in paragraph 2, 
you're still taking judgment for $1,925 and satisfying it. 
Again, I don't think it makes a bit of difference one way or 
another except that it's different than what the arrangement 
was. I suppose Mr. Armstrong, I mean, could have chosen to 
pay the $1,925 today or not at all, or whatever, if a judgment 
had been entered. 



























that the $1,925 just takes care of it. There's not legal 
interest on that, it doesn't—and regardless of how we do 
that, it's taken care of. Again, as with the prior concern 
you had in that paragraph 9, I don't know that it makes any 
difference one way or another. But I will amend that para-
graph 2 simply to accurately cite what we did. And that is 
the judgment for the sales tax by the defendant is not granted 
for the reason that the amount was paid in court. And the 
Findings of Fact already acknowledge that it was due and owing 
and it was paid. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, just as Mr. Gold wants 
that sentence in there, I don't want it in there. 
THE COURT: Did you not hear me? I'm going to take 
it out, okay? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: In paragraph 9? 
THE COURT: In paragraph 2. I've already ruled on 
that one. I'm going to keep that— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't see why he can have things 
that never happened in court— 
THE COURT: Because—I'll tell you exactly why, 
Mr. Armstrong. And that is because these are my findings and 
my conclusions, I found them and I ruled that way. If you 
don't like it, appeal it. I don't know how else to say it to 
you, okay? If you don't like it, appeal that. That statement 



























listened very carefully, I did the very best job I could in 
this case, okay? I ruled against you. When we have a law-
suit, somebody wins, somebody loses, okay? I found the 
evidence to be more persuasive that the contract, in fact, 
(a) was completed, (b) that you owed the money, (c) that your 
attempting to terminate it was a day late and a dollar short. 
She already earned the money. 
Whether or not this letter was mailed, it didn't 
matter one iota in the decision to me because she had already 
earned the money. I believe that by a simple preponderance of 
the evidence. It's not a criminal case, it's a civil case. 
The preponderance of the evidence was indeed that she was 
entitled to the money. Your efforts to terminate had no force 
or effect. 
Again, paragraph No. 9 is consistent with that. To a 
degree it's arguably multiplying words that may be unnecessary 
but it certainly is consistent with the ruling of the Court. 
And there is nothing in paragraph 9 that is inconsistent with 
my ruling. It accurately reflects what it is. Had I written 
it first instead of having attorneys draft it, I'd probably 
have been a little less wordy. I probably would have mada the 
two sentences into one sentence. But I have no problem with 
signing that, it accurately reflects the ruling of the Court. 
Okay. Now, does that answer that one for you? 


























THE COURT: What does never mind me? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't agree with you. 
THE COURT: Well, I just—you're the litigant and I'm 
the Judge. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: That doesn't matter. 
THE COURT: You're entitled to understand—you're 
entitled to present your position but that doesn't mean that 
you get it granted every time. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, now paragraph No. 2 on 
the judgment form, I'm going to have that paragraph No. 2 
altered, Mr. Gold, again to reflect consistently both with the 
prior direction by the Court and the firm understanding when 
that payment was made in court. And that is that judgment 
would not be—would, in fact, not enter for that amount. 
Again, I'm not sure it makes any practical difference 
to enter and—simultaneously enter and satisfy a judgment. It 
probably has the same—it doesn't make any practical 
difference. But, again, that was the understanding 
Mr. Armstrong had and the Court had and I think that it's more 
appropriate that the judgment reflect that. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, I don't agree with you 
but you're the Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, what I'm going to do is—I 



























interlineation. Is this on your word processor? 
MR. GOLD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. How I'm going to change this, 
paragraph No. 2, is, "Judgment for sales tax owed to plaintiff 
by defendant in the amount of $1,925 is"—instead of "here-
with," I'm going to strike that and put "not granted to 
plaintiff as against defendant." And then eliminate the' 
period and put "for the reason that said amount was volun-
tarily paid at the conclusion of the trial." 
The next sentence will remain, "No interest or 
penalties as may be assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission 
are awarded to the plaintiff on said amount." So, that 
protects you, Mr. Armstrong, that you're not going to—at 
least this Court is not going to order that you pick up any 
additional amount for the late payment. 
The next sentence, "Payment by plaintiff of the 
$1,925"—I'm being a little redundant. "Said payment"—we'll 
insert the word, "Said payment by the defendant of"—let's 
eliminate that second "said"—"$1,925 to the plaintiff at the 
trial between the parties shall constitute satisfaction of 
said"—"shall constitute satisfaction and be in lieu of said 
judgment amount. No interest is awarded to plaintiff in 
connection with said amount." 
Okay. Do you—Mr. Gold, do you have that that you 



























MR. GOLD: We could do that in very short order. How 
long will you be here today? I'd like to get this thing 
signed and entered today. 
THE COURT: I'll be here, oh, I'm sure an hour. 
MR. GOLD: We can do that. 
THE COURT: Can we do that? Okay, and Mr. Armstrong 
I will also direct the Clerk of the Court to provide a copy of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment to 
you with those amendments. And specifically, then, as I 
understand it, there were two objections that you had to the 
proposed Findings of Fact—to the second submitted proposed 
Findings of Fact. One regarding the second sentence of 
paragraph 9 on the Conclusions of Law. I overruled that 
objection and agreed to sign that document as submitted. 
With respect to your second objection, the judgment 
being granted for $1,925 and then simultaneously satisfied, 
I'm granting your objection to that and indicating that it 
does not technically comport with the understanding during the 
course of the trial. I note Mr. Gold objects to that but I'm 
granting your objection and directing that paragraph 2 be so 
amended. 
And let me say again, I think I do understand that 
Mr. Gold would have preferred to have a judgment (inaudible). 
I would presume that he would prefer to have interest and the 



























have the $1,925 earn interest since the day it was due. For 
whatever equitable powers this Court has in hearing this 
matter, I simply ruled against that as a matter of equity. 
Specifically, that both parties really were party to this 
nonpayment of sales tax initially. And I just didn't think it 
was fair and appropriate that Mr. Armstrong bear the burden of 
that when both parties, with their eyes open, acknowledged 
that sales tax was not being paid initially. And, again, 
that's just a matter of equity and fairness. 
Again, I guess this is what trials are for, to sort 
out contesting perspectives and different points of view. 
Again, I tried to do the best I can for that and so the—and I 
do believe that the judgment, then, form and Findings of Fact 
as I've directed those be changed, accurately reflect those. 
Again, it's not as either of you would have them but I believe 
the findings and conclusions and judgment form is consistent 
with the ruling of the Court. And I have no problem with any 
of that. 
Anything else then for the record, Mr. Gold? 
MR. GOLD: For the record, I have just delivered to 
Mr. Armstrong Notice of Entry of Judgment, it being the 
anticipation that it will be entered this date. And I would 
ask the Court to sign— 
THE COURT: Yeah, I will sign and enter it today. If 




THE COURT: I'll file the Notice of Entry with the 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Gold, for that. 
Thank you, Mr. Armstrong, and Ifm sorry that you all had to 
come back a number of times and get this all sorted out. But 
it is finally done now. Thank you very much, both of you. 
(This hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
* * * 
10 I * * * 
1 1 I * * * 
12 I * * * 
13 I * * * 
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15 I * * * 
16 I * * * 
17 I * * * 
18 * * * 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This matter is—I can't tell from the— 
THE CLERK: Which one is that, Judge Livingston? 
THE COURT: On the--
THE CLERK: Small claims? 
THE COURT: No, on the Concept West Interiors. 
THE CLERK: Just a hearing. 
THE COURT: Prior to trial. 
MR. GOLD: Is this Gillham? 
THE CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. GOLD: Brent Gold, Your Honor, for the plaintiff 
in this matter. Mr. Armstrong has filed a motion. 
Mr. Armstrong represents himself in this matter. He's filed a 
motion, it's his motion, that's the reason we're here today. 
THE COURT: And this is your Motion for Request for 
Production of Documents, is this what we're talking about? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: What I filed, Your Honor, was a 
request for production of documents to them and also a request 
for a continuance of the trial so I can complete getting the 
documents and the deposition of Ms. Gillham and some documents 
from the state. 
MR. GOLD: This matter is scheduled for trial on 
February 10th right now, Your Honor. And we would oppose his 


























THE COURT: Okay. Why—golly. We're going to have 
some problems, I know, with this. We're being cut back to two 
days a month, essentially, in this court. The problem is—I'm 
just speaking out loud to you, Mr. Gold, you certainly have a 
right to file cases in the—wherever the Circuit Court sits. 
The problem is, there's so few of them that I don't—I can't 
schedule regular trial days for civil cases and it just 
becomes really, really awkward. So, I'm just telling you 
right up front that I'm going to put a little pressure on you 
this morning to see if we can resolve this. If it can't be, 
I'll—I may have to hear this in Coalville. How long do you 
think it would take, the trial? 
MR. GOLD: Well, I think that if we try the case, we 
should be able to do this—I'd like to say half a day. 
Recently, I don't think I've ever been able to accomplish 
anything in half a day. It always runs to a day. We ought to 
be able to do it in half a day. I don't think there would be 
any more than three or four witnesses called in the matter. 
But, again, we don't—at this point, I don't know how many 
witnesses Mr. Armstrong would intend to call. 
In terms of our position in connection with his 
motion, this matter has been filed with this Court since 
August of last year. And until Mr. Armstrong's documents were 
filed with the Court approximately the middle part of this 


























had been set that spurred his filing of these motions. And, 
of course, pursuant to our procedural rules and rules of the 
Court, his request for discovery less than 30 days prior to 
trial is inappropriate. 
I understand he is not represented by counsel. We 
have letters in the file where he's clearly indicated he's 
very knowledgeable and you can see from his filings he's been 
in court before. The one significant communication we have 
had with him was where he indicated he's been involved in 
several litigation amounts, he knows full well the conse-
quences and I don't think he minced any words in emphasizing 
to my client that this could be very costly and expensive for 
her if she continued to pursue the matter. I think now he's 
evidencing that sort of situation. 
The matter is set for trial. He's done nothing in 
connection with prior preparation for it. The matter is a 
relatively simply matter, straightforward contract. That 
which he doesn't have, he ought to have. He claims he doesn't 
have, he ought to have. He's had plenty of time to do it and 
in the interests of justice we'd like to try this matter and 
be done with it so as to avoid the accumulation of costs and 
fees that he so well pointed out. 
THE COURT: Let's go through just a moment and let 
Mr. Armstrong say what he wants to about the trial. He is 



























MR. ARMSTRONG: I'm requesting her records of what 
services she provided to us, the receipts she provided when 
she bought the furniture, etc. for our account, her records of 
communication and documenting what she did for us and didn't 
do. I'm also asking for the copies of her returns with the 
Utah State Tax Commission. 
THE COURT: Okay, those are nondiscoverable. That's 
going to be real easy. I'm not going to make her give you a 
copy of her—you don't get to look at her state tax returns 
because she claims you owe her money. That's—there's no 
reason that should be. Is that going to be at issue? You're 
not going to introduce her tax returns, are you, Mr. Gold? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: She's claiming that we owe sales tax 
on the purchases. And so the sales tax returns are very 
valid, Your Honor. 
MR. GOLD: There is an issue that may legitimately be 
in question. The contract that we're talking about was a 
contract for furnishings, furniture, fixtures, etc. for 
Mr. Armstrong's home. My client is an interior designer. 
Part of the claim is for sales tax owed to the State of Utah 
that my client claims that Mr. Armstrong has not paid, all 
right? 
As I understand what he's asking for is something -

























sales tax amount. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: And the fact that she reported these 
purchases and that they, in fact, were—and the sales tax, in 
fact, has (inaudible). 
MR. GOLD: And we have absolutely no problem in 
giving him that information. We really don't. We can provide 
him— 
THE COURT: Well, she's a cash basis taxpayer, I 
presume? She's not paying sales tax on to the state that she 
didn't collect, is she? 
MR. GOLD: Well, that's part of the problem, I would 
represent to the Court, is this: We've informed the State of 
Utah as—and she is a cash basis, all right? The State—we 
informed the State of Utah of this problem, that there is a 
matter in litigation and that there is money that we believe 
is owed to the State of Utah in connection with this matter. 
The State of Utah is fully informed of the matter and 
they claim to have lien rights as against my client because 
they claim, notwithstanding her cash basis, that if she hasn't 
collected from him she should have collected it from him and 
should have paid it to the State of Utah. So, they claim— 
THE COURT: Did she pay sales tax when she purchased 
it? Or she—no, she buys it wholesale and doesn't pay sales 
tax. 


























THE COURT: And doesn't pay sales tax? 
MR. GOLD: And does not pay sales tax at that point, 
that's correct. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, she's to report that at 
the time she purchases it and the time the transactions take 
place, whether or not we pay— 
THE COURT: Whether she does or doesn't, that doesn't 
have anything to do with whether or not you owe her money, 
frankly. I'm not going to turn into this. I want you to 
understand right up front, Mr. Armstrong, this trial's going 
to be very narrow. And it's on whether or not you in fact owe 
Concepts West Interiors some money or not. And if you do, 
then there's going to be a judgment. If you don't, you don't. 
And if you owe her sales tax, whether or not she in 
fact paid that on to the state, whether she's got a problem 
with the State Tax Commission or not, that's a matter that I'm 
not going to be concerned with. That's beyond the purview of 
I this case. The State Tax Commission is a—they're big boys 
and girls and they can handle it and they can do what they're 
going to do as far as collecting sales tax. I don't work for 
the State Tax Commission, I'm not going to turn this trial 
into more than it is. 
So, to the degree that existence of these documents 











how they do or how they don't. But to that degree, you're 
entitled to discover them. Even assuming worst case, and that 
is that Ms. Gillham, dba Concepts West Interiors, is not 
paying the sales tax that she is required under law to pay, 
that is not your concern nor is it the concern of this Court. 
And that's not going to make any difference whatsoever how I 
rule in this case. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor, I beg to differ. There 
are certain circumstances where she's obligated to pay the 
sales tax and there's certain circumstances she's not. And 













THE COURT: Well, let me just say, Mr. Armstrong, 
whether in fact she owes money to the State of Utah, I don't 
care about for the purpose of this case. That has nothing to 
do what I'm—is it six percent of the amount that you're 
claiming is sales tax? Is that what you're— 
MR. GOLD: The exact percentage, Your Honor, is 
probably something in excess of that. It amounts to— 
originally amounted to approximately $1,900. And, of course, 
the State of Utah is now claiming penalty and interest in 
connection with it because this is a third quarter '92 matter. 
That's when the—at least the State of Utah claims it should 
have been paid. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, let's just get to the heart 


























deliver to Mr. Armstrong; is that correct? 
MR. GOLD: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that answers that one, then. 
When can they be delivered to him? 
MR. GOLD: I111 have to meet with my client and 
obtain those. But we can provide those within—not later than 
a week. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, that answers that— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I also ask for a depo—to be able to 
depose her. 
THE COURT: Well, why did you wait to make a deposi-
tion—request a deposition prior to the—until after a trial 
notice was sent? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Okay. I hate to make an excuse. I'm 
not an attorney. I just moved here from California. I got 
the notice—the request for the trial hearing while I was out 
of town and by the time I got back from that trip you'd 
already set the trial. 
THE COURT: What information are you attempting to 
elicit from Ms. Gillham? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: That goes to the heart of the matter, 
but there are issues about the sales tax and furniture and 
when she did work for us. And there's disputes over all 



























THE COURT: And the total amount you're claiming is 
$3,000; is that correct? 
MR. GOLD: The total amount, Your Honor, is set forth 
in the complaint. It's approximately $3,900. We claim that 
all of that was owed on or about, I'm estimating, July 31, 
1992. It might have been July 1, 1992, plus interest. We've 
made an allegation with respect to attorney's fees and bad 
faith defense in connection with the matter. 
THE COURT: Is there any basis for attorney's fees 
other than the bad faith defense? 
MR. GOLD: There is no contract— 
THE COURT: There's not contract or statute for it? 
MR. GOLD: —that sets forth the requirement, the 
allegation. Again, we're (inaudible) statutory basis of bad 
faith (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Uh— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Your Honor. I want to say 
(inaudible) is I've had an interest in resolving this from the 
beginning, from the first conversation with Ms. Gillham and 
even today (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, this is set for trial for 
February the 10th. I suppose, Mr. Gold, that a pro se 
defendant really ought not have the rules of procedure—even 
though he's certainly not the most naive of pro se defendants, 



























some generous application of the rules in terms of time. 
I will say this, though, Mr. Armstrong. I'm not 
certain on a $3,000 claim, essentially, why someone would want 
to spend a—oh, a third or maybe a fourth, anyway, of the cost 
of that in terms of taking a deposition._ Other than, I 
suppose, there is some legitimate—there is some legitimacy to 
the point that Mr. Gold's making, frankly, that you're just 
trying to drive up the cost of litigation to force a settle-
ment. And I guess what I want to say to you is there's a lot 
that can be accomplished in terms of looking at documents. 
You can ask Mr. Gold, What's your position on this, Why are 
you claiming that, that could be handled a lot less expen-
sively for what is essentially a collection matter of $3,000. 
What I'm saying to you is I'm going to give you the 
right to—give you the opportunity to exercise your right to 
take a deposition. If—I'm going—however, if the plaintiff 
prevails in this case, number one, and if, number two, there 
was no substantial information gleaned from that or I'm not 
able to receive in the course of a trial some information that 
makes that a legitimate exercise in discovery, I want you to 
understand that I•m going to award attorney's fees to Mr. Gold 
for the benefit of his client for the—at least for the cost 
of the deposition. May or may not be liable for attorney's 
fees for the trial and other things, but at least for that 























appearance for deposition if ultimately I determine that 
simply was not needful or appropriate. 
And, again, I just got to say to you, if you had an 
attorney, I don't think an attorney is going to say to you, 
Let's go depose the plaintiff, unless for some reason Mr. Gold 
is just—is not very well forthcoming on providing information 
to you. Spending the cost for a deposition on a $3,000 claim 
smells of, smacks of simply trying to needlessly escalate the 
costs of litigation, number one. And number two, just trying 
to postpone, unfairly, a trial. 
J And I think particularly when—and, again, I say 
when—if this turns out to be more or less a personal 
relationship, personal contractual relationship to which you 
already had know—this involves conversations you've already 
had—you had, not other people. If this were a large 
corporate conglomerate and you talked to someone who's not a 
party to the action and it's information you really need, 
that's one thing. If it's—if you are—if what I end up 
hearing at trial the evidence is simply conversations between 
the two of you, you're already party to those and you don't 
really need to depose someone to discover what was said. You 
were a party to those. That's exactly the kind of case that 
I'm going to liberally award costs and fees on, if that's why 
you're doing it. 



























provides any guidance to you. What I am saying to you is I'm 
going to grant your motion, even though technically you're not 
entitled to that, because you're a pro se defendant. And if 
you really want the opportunity to depose the plaintiff, I'll 
let you do that. 
But I would urge you to think carefully if—why 
you're really doing that. If it's really information that 
you're genuinely seeking, that you can get no other way, and 
I'm going to let you put the plaintiff to that cost. But, 
again, it's an issue I'm going to deal with later at trial. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Can I respond for a second? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not—the rule is you can appeal 
me but you can't argue with me. I'm not going to—and I want 
you to understand that now and at trial, also. That's not the 
point of this. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: There's a request for admissions and 
possibly after looking at the documents and seeing their 
request for admissions that maybe a deposition isn't 
necessary. So far this case has not been very amicable or 
(inaudible) been working together and I have no thought that 
that would change. 
MR. GOLD: Your Honor, in connection with this—the 
lack of amicability is certainly not between Mr. Armstrong and 
myself. I've never talked to him prior to today. It might be 



























THE COURT: Sure, that's why you have lawsuits. We— 
hopefully, people don't punch each other out, they hire 
lawyers. That's right. 
MR. GOLD: He has filed requests for production of 
documents. He has filed notice with the-State of Utah for 
requests for production of documents. 
THE COURT: The State of Utah? 
MR. GOLD: Tax Commission. 
THE COURT: Well, they're not going to respond to 
that. You can give them a subpoena, I suppose. They won't 
respond to that, either. These are confidential—aren't they? 
MR. GOLD: Exactly. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: They would only respond to a court 
order. 
THE COURT: And they're not going to get one. 
MR. GOLD: And he mentions admissions. And he has— 
he has asked for six admissions and those can be summarily 
given to him. I mean, you know, there's a formal form that we 
use. I'm not going to take 3 0 days to do that. I'll give him 
his response to those request for admissions and I can assure 
him that they're all going to be in the negative to what he's 
looking for. But he will have those, as well, within that 
one-week period of time. 
Again, in granting his motion, are you saying you're 



























THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask him—if he wants 
to take the deposition, I'm going to continue the trial date. 
But I'm just cautioning him that (a) I'm not sure that is in 
the—is what you really want to do, given the scope of this 
case. And, again, I'm just going to say it's a $3,000 collec-
tion case, is what it is. And I'm not going to—I'm not going 
to allow you just to escalate the cost needlessly for a $3,000 
case. 
On the other hand, if it's something you legitimately 
need to do, then do it. But you ought to make that decision, 
understanding that ultimately if the plaintiff prevails in 
this case and we get to an issue of awarding costs and fees, 
I'm going to look at what attorney's fees were incurred in bad 
faith. And, frankly, compelling a deposition when—if all 
you're going to ask about are conversations the two of you had 
with each other you're already a party to, I'm just not—that 
doesn't even pass the smell test, okay? And that's something 
you're very likely to be hit on on some attorney's fees. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I feel, Your Honor, that her filing a 
lawsuit and hiring an attorney was the same idea—(inaudible) 
they expected me to hire an attorney and have to pay the 
expenses. 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't know if Mr.—what has 
Mr. Gold done that's been unreasonable and that you believe I 



























MR. ARMSTRONG: I'm saying, just to bring me into 
court over this—I tried to resolve it with Ms. Gillham a long 
time ago—to file a lawsuit against me anticipating that I 
have to get an attorney is no different than—they're trying 
to run up costs to force me to settle. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't—I'm not going to—I'll 
help you with that one right now. And that is I'm not going 
to rule that filing a lawsuit is, in and of itself, inapprop-
riate, harassment or anything else. That's what trials are 
for. You get your day in court and everyone gets to present 
their side and I try to listen fairly and impartially the best 
I can and make the best judgment I can, Mr. Armstrong. 
But simply because you file—I don't know of many 
defendants that like the fact they were sued. I don't think 
that you're in a particularly unique situation from any other 
civil defendant. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I just don't see the difference 
between them causing me attorney's fees and me causing them 
attorney's fees, why that would be in relation to how you 
award attorney's fees. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not" going to award you 
attorney's fees if you didn't incur any, number one. You've 
chosen to be pro se. If in the course of a trial you were to 
convince me that this action was brought in bad faith, without 



























required you to take depositions and do things that were 
simply a waste of time and running up costs, then absolutely, 
I would consider a motion to award fees back. 
But that's not what I have before me. I have a 
plaintiff that brought an action. There was no ostensible 
reason why a deposition should be taken in the case. And if 
that proves to be correct, that there was no needful, approp-
riate reason for the deposition, I'm just telling you you're 
on the hook for the costs of those. 
If Mr. Gold required something for you to do that 
incurred a cost that was not needful, it was merely for 
harass, delay, then absolutely you're going to be looking— 
you'd be entitled to some sanctions back to him. The rules 
apply both ways. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I contemplated hiring an attorney 
actually for the trial. Do I still have the right or the 
ability to do that? 
THE COURT: Sure. You can—you have the right to 
represent yourself or anyone that you want to have—licensed 
to practice law in the State of Utah—can appear on your 
behalf. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: There's no problem with that at all. 
Again, what I want to know is just whether or not you want to 



























late. The trial date was set when you made the request. 
Because you are a pro se defendant, I'm willing to let you 
still take the deposition in a late fashion. If you want to 
do that, that's fine. But I want you to understand the—that 
you're, in one sense, upping the ante by—doing that. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: What I would like to do is get some 
kind of a continuance on the trial, see these documents, get 
these answers and hopefullv not have the deposition. But if 
these—if I don't get—I don't have the documents to review to 
see if I'm getting all the information that I'd like to have 
at this point. 
THE COURT: Well--
MR. ARMSTRONG: Taking what you've said in mind, 
trying not to do the deposition. 
THE COURT: The problem is—see, once I go into 
March, I go on this half-day in Park City matter that is going 
to be really hard. And February 24th I have two jury trials 
that I could—Mr. Gold, if this meets with your schedule—I 
could bump it back one week to Wednesday, the 17th. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I'll be out of town that day. 
MR. GOLD: We can accommodate you. We had two 
choices of dates, the 10th and the 17th. 
THE COURT: The 10th and the 17th is really all there 
is. And you can have your choice, also, Mr. Armstrong, of the 



























got, again, a jury trial on the 24th and then I'm only here 
half days and this is a half day civil trial and it would 
really be extremely difficult to fit that in. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, I can't do it the 17th. 
MR. GOLD: Your Honor, let me propose this: We can 
give him the documents. If he wants to take his deposition, 
he can take it before the 10th. 
THE COURT: Any reason why you couldn't do that? 
MR. GOLD: (Inaudible) everything—I think he's 
scheduled—at least tentatively, he's got it scheduled for— 
no, he's scheduled it for March 12th. 
THE COURT: Any reason why—why don't you just take 
the deposition before February 10th? Like— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I probably don't have any choice, do 
I? So— 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, you have some input. No, 
the choice is mine, that's correct. The choice is mine, 
ultimately. I'm trying to be fair and listen to your 
concerns, Mr. Gold's concerns, trying to balance— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I asked for the continuance so that 
I'd have more time to prepare for this. I didn•t have an idea 
that it was going to be coming that fast. I want to look at 
these documents. That's why I asked for the continuance. If 
I thought I could get it done, I wouldn't have asked. I can't 



























THE COURT: Okay. Well, okay. So, if we went on the 
10th, what day could you take the deposition before the 10th? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Uh, what's the Friday before that? 
When are you going to have the documents to me? 
MR. GOLD: We'll have them to you by Wednesday of 
next week, and hopefully earlier. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, it would be that Friday, then. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: If I choose to do it. 
THE COURT: And the date for that, then, Mr. Gold, 
is? 
MR. GOLD: Today is the 27th. 
THE COURT: And Friday's the 30th. It would be—is 
that the 6th of February? 
MR. GOLD: So, that would be the 5th of February. 
THE COURT: 5th of February. Okay. Then why don't 
we—is there any problem, then, with making—with ordering 
that the plaintiff respond to the discovery in terms of 
providing documents and providing—for responding to the 
request for admissions not later than one week from today, 
which would be February 3rd, at the latest, have that 
responded, and ordering that if the plaintiff—rather, the 
defendant chooses to do so, can depose the plaintiff in this 
case on Friday, February the 5th? 



























then, Mr. Armstrong? 
• MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, honestly no, but I don't see 
any choices, so, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. What need doesn't that meet? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: It's too fast for me. You know, 
that's why I asked for a continuance. We're still going to 
trial on the same day and I'm going to have two days to look 
at the documents. But, you know, that's what you can do, 
that's what you can do. 
THE COURT: Yeah. If there were a—and just for the 
record and so you understand that I know, again, those are 
choices that you made, I've—I just can't—I've got a criminal 
jury trial set on the 24th. All I can do is do what I can 
with the resources that I have. And I offered to you the 17t.h 
as an alternate and that was a choice that you made that 
you'd— 
MR. ARMSTRONG: I have an airline ticket, I will be 
out of the state. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I have a criminal jury trial 
the next week. And as between you and me, guess who gets to 
choose? Okay? So, that's the answer to that. But I just 
want you to know that the fact on the 10th and not the 17th, I 
mean, that's, again, at least partially a consequence of a 
choice that you've made, okay? 

































continue the trial 
(This 
—the motion for discovery is granted. 
a deposition is granted but the motion to 
date is 
hearing was 
denied. Thank you. 
concluded.) 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the time set for trial in the 
matter of Yvonne Gillham, doing business as Concepts Interiors 
versus Donald E. Armstrong. The record should reflect that 
the plaintiff is present personally before the Court today, 
represented by her attorney, Mr. Brent A. Gold. The defendant 
is appearing pro se in this matter. Mr. Donald E. Armstrong 
is also present. 
Are there any matters preliminarily, either Mr. Gold 
or Mr. Armstrong, before we start the trial? 
MR. GOLD: The only matter I can think of, Your 
Honor, is related to your convenience. 
THE COURT: Oh, we'll just suck it up. We're okay. 
MR. GOLD: Are you all right. 
THE COURT: Yeah, we'll be fine. 
MR. GOLD: If you'd like to take some time for lunch 
or something. 
THE COURT: No, no. In fact, we have—I had a clerk 
running to get some things. We'll be okay. That's kind of 
you, though. Thank you, Mr. Gold. 
Anything preliminarily, Mr. Armstrong? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you go ahead, then, 
and—do we need to have opening statements or do you want to 


























THE COURT: I'll be in recess just very briefly. 
(A recess was taken.) 
(When tape starts again, it begins in progress with 
another witness who later is identified as Susan St. James.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (IN PROGRESS) 
BY MR. ARMSTRONG: 
A And so I went through another designer to get that. 
Q This is after March of '92; is that correct? 
A Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: You went directly to the vendor and not 
through the plaintiff? 
THE WITNESS: I went through the vendor and then 
through another designer. 
THE COURT: You had to have another designer because 
that vendor only sold to designers; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q Now, were you the one that handled roost of the— 
going over these bills that Yvonne gave us and tried to make 
sense of them? 
A Yes. 
Q Did I give you that set of documents? 
A You've given me a set of invoices and purchase orders 
and copies of checks. 
Q Okay. The first calls for money we got from Yvonne 
were sometime in 1991; is that correct? 
30 
